Abstract. -The common perception of the great estate in Andean Peru during the twentieth century held that it represented a "feudal" institution owned by landlords possessing a non-entrepreneurial outlook and little interest in agricultural modernisation. In the social sphere, it was claimed that the estate utilised non-waged labour and operated an oppressive system of debt bondage. This article discusses this mainstream view through an examination of the hacienda San Felipe de Combayo, located in Peru's northern highlands. It is argued that in important aspects socio-economic conditions prevailing on Combayo differed from the stereotypical image popularised by Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre in the 1920s and accepted uncritically by many later authors.
INTRODUCTION
Encouraged by the land reform implemented under the military government of Juan Velasco , over the past two decades a significant increase has taken place in both the quantity and quality of research on the Peruvian Andes. There has been a marked tendency, however, for investigation to concentrate on a narrow range of themes. A perusal of titles published since 1980 by Peru's leading academic press -the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos -illustrates this point: a majority of books addressing agrarian issues have been devoted to the social organisation of Andean peasant communities, household economy, the impact of changes in land tenure on freeholders and patterns of technological modernisation within smallholding farming systems. Publications in English and research by non-Peruvians has tended to focus on similar topics.
1 Given the historical importance in economic and social terms of the hacienda in Andean society, it is surprising to discover that research on the great estate has been conspicuous by its absence. Although the 1980s saw the appearance of a small number of worthy studies on the colonial period, no thoroughly researched monograph was published on the organisation of highland estates during the twentieth century. 2 A revision of the most important journals -Allpanchis, Revista Andina, Debate Agrario, Hispanic American Historical Review, etc. -also testifies to the paucity of publications and the overall dearth of investigation into this key rural institution. Revealingly, the weak state of research on haciendas in highland Peru stands in marked contrast to recent advances made in the historiography of Mexico, where a steady expansion of knowledge since the mid-1970s has led to the questioning of accepted perceptions about rural society and provoked lively debates on the operation of large landed estates, the causes of peasant unrest and related themes. As far as Peru is concerned, however, a "traditional" view of the Andean hacienda popularised by the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in the 1920s stili predominates. For Mariátegui, rural Peru at this juncture remained dominated by a hacienda system that was "feudal" in the Andes and "semi-feudal" with regard to the export-orientated coastal sugar and cotton estates. The poverty afflicting the mass of rural people in the sierra, Mariátegui posited, mainly derived from the usurpation of village land and widespread extra-economic coercion on the part of local elites and rapacious government functionaries. Highland landowners retained a "feudal" Weltanschauung. Accordingly, the Andean hacienda comprised a "feudal" institution characterised by an emphasis on self-sufficiency, minimal market contact and a general lack of investment on the part of retrograde landlords who lacked capitalist mores. In it social aspects, the latifundio was said to depend on nonfree, non-wage, "servile" labour systems. 4 Haya de la Torre concurred with this perspective. He opined that following the Conquest the Andean peasantry "was quickly converted into a slave", a condition that after Independence "continued without change [...] I know Cajamarca, Apurimac and other parts of the Peruvian sierra. You cannot imagine the horrors that are committed there. I have seen Indians with their skin cut by the staves with which they beat them", for which reason land nationalisation aimed at the expropriation of "the powerful feudal landowners" formed a central plank in the political programme of APRA.
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Even though these polemicists possessed a limited knowledge of the Andean countryside, viewed it through urban spectacles and wrote for political ends, the extremely negative image of the hacienda was adopted uncritically by a later generation of scholars, among them such established figures as Frank Tannenbaum, Eric Wolf and Sydney Mintz, to the extent that by the early 1970s the veracity of rural "feudalism" was only questioned by eccentric interlopers like Gunder Frank. 6 So deeply engrained, however, was the orthodox interpretation that Frank's claim that great estates in Latin America comprised profit-orientated enterprises was dismissed summarily by most Peruvianists, a state of affairs that persists to this day. Two brief examples suffice to illustrate that the Mariátegui-Haya-Tannenbaum thesis is still very much alive. In a recent monograph, Ernesto Yepes has maintained that the northern highlands of Peru remained a "precapitalist" agrarian society during the 1930s and 1940s, characterised by the domination of the hacienda, a prevalence of non-free labour and gamonal exploitation. Carmen Diana Deere repeats this formula, sustaining that as late as the 1940s economic stagnation and "feudal class relations" based on extra-economic coercion predominated in the department of Caj amarca, where all-powerful landlords subjugated helpless indebted peons, who in a majority of cases did not receive wage payments until the 1950s and 1960s.
7
The objective of this article is to review these claims through an examination of economic and social relations found on the hacienda San Felipe de Combayo. The questions to be addressed include landowner attitudes ("feudal" versus entrepreneurial), market contact, investment policy, agricultural practices and labour regime. Archival sources are employed when discussing these issues, as well as the dissertation completed in 1918 by Nicolás Santolalla Bernal as part of his studies to obtain his agronomy degree at the Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina, located outside Lima. This is one of the most important studies on agriculture in Peru's northern highlands written during the early part of the twentieth century. It provides a wealth of detail regarding the organisation of Combayo, the farming system utilised on the estate, production costs and profitability. This level of information was to be expected: when Santolalla wrote his thesis he was in a position to obtain all the data he required and write with knowledge and authority, for the simple reason that the hacienda had belonged to his family since the late colonial period.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Located some 24 kilometres from the town of Caj amarca, the hacienda Combayo ranked among the most extensive latifundios in Peru's northern highlands, covering approximately 43,000 hectares. Established in the early colonial period, during the eighteenth century the property supported over 20,000 head of sheep and housed one of the most productive obrajes in the Partido de Cajamarca.
8 Even though by the late colonial period the woollen manufactory (like many others in Cajamarca) had entered into decline, the estate remained an attractive investment proposition, which persuaded Juan Manuel Bernal to purchase the hacienda in 1802. Upon the death of Bernal, the property passed to his widow, María Arana, who after administering Combayo for several decades, left it to her twelve heirs in 1888. Meanwhile two of María Arana's granddaughters -María and Micaela -had married the brothers Eloy and Francisco Santolalla Iglesias, with Francisco Santolalla taking over the administration of the hacienda in 1889. When performing this task, Santolalla initially received assistance from his brother-in-laws Ricardo Bernal and Miguel Montoya Bernal, and paid an annual rent to the other inheritors. Employing capital accumulated through their mining activities at Hualgayoc (approximately 40 kilometres distant from the estate), the Santolalla brothers began to purchase the shares of the co-owners. This move was welcomed by some members of the family, while being opposed by others (such as Carlos Montoya Bernal), but eventually the financial clout of the Santolalla's prevailed, a process that culminated with Eloy Santolalla acquiring all the shares in Combayo and emerging as its sole owner in 1897.
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Although the hacienda was formally registered in Eloy's name, in practice his brother Francisco remained half-owner of the property and it was he who assumed responsibility for the day-to-day running of the enterprise, leaving Eloy to devote his energies to advancing the family's mining interests. Indeed, upon attaining ownership of Combayo the Santolalla brothers were faced with a daunting task as they prepared to develop the estate, for its capital assets, productivity and profitability had been seriously undermined during the 1880s as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-82) and the civil war between iglesistas and caceristas that raged in this region between 1883 and 1885. Eloy and Francisco Santolalla were nephews of Miguel Iglesias, one of the two main protagonists in this factional conflict, and naturally comprised part of this caudillo's political band, in which they had participated from at least 1871. Due to family ties, María Arana also fell into the Iglesias camp, a link that became even closer once the Santolalla Iglesias brothers married her granddaughters.
To this backdrop, once the Chilean troops invaded the department of Cajamarca (1881) and heard that the leader of the Peruvian forces, Miguel Iglesias, was stationed in the hacienda Combayo, they attacked the property and although Iglesias managed to escape, the rotos "stole jewellery valued at over one thousand soles and imposed a ransom of three thousand soles, before taking off with all they could loot" from the estate. 10 Shortly after, when Miguel Iglesias was installed as President of Peru with Chilean backing and signed a humiliating peace treaty in order to put an end to the conflict (1882), the hacienda logically became a target for his factional enemies who opposed what they regarded as an unpatriotic capitulation. As a result, montonera columns loyal to the cacerista caudillo José Mercedes Puga invaded Combayo on various occasions between 1883 and 1885, "carrying off whatever took their fancy" and destroying the estate's infrastructure, while the depredation of Combayo's resources was worsened by the activities of bands of brigands operating from the minifundio zones that surrounded the hacienda.
11 Professional rustlers and more impromptu thieves took advantage of the generalised chaos and breakdown in state authority to plunder its livestock and crops.
Given this situation, when Francisco Santolalla started to administer Combayo in the late 1880s, the estate was decapitalised completely, its buildings either incendiarised or fallen into a state of disrepair and the irrigation system in decay. Established hierarchies had been shaken severely as one faction of the traditional elite remained discredited in the eyes of many serranos. Within this environment Santolalla noted that it was necessary "to reorder the administration and rationalise the work system. Without this, the estate would not be productive".
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To set this in motion, Francisco went to live in Combayo and set about developing the enterprise. During the 1890s moves were made to augment the number of livestock grazing on the estate and increase the sown area. Agricultural products were marketed in the mining camps of Hualgayoc, the town of Cajamarca and the northern coast. A furnace to smelt copper and silver was also installed on the estate, fuelled by timber supplied from Combayo's woodlands.
Given these antecedents, it was perhaps logical that when the son of Francisco Santolalla and Micaela Bernal entered university to study agronomy, he would write his thesis on the hacienda Combayo. Moreover, given the interest of his father and uncle Eloy to raise the productivity and profitability of the latifundio, it was also to be expected that the central themes of his dissertation would be: how can the farming practices and productivity of Combayo best be improved? What investments will yield the highest profit? What labour system will bring the most profit? When attempting to answer these questions, he provided a detailed account of the workings of a large estate in Peru's northern highlands during the early part of the twentieth century, and it is to a consideration of these issues that we now turn.
WORKING PRACTICES AND LABOUR REGIME
Like most estates in the department of Cajamarca during the early twentieth century, Combayo was a latifundio organised along Gutsherrschaft lines (i.e. one section of the estate was cultivated directly by peasant households, while a second section was exploited by the landowner). Inside Combayo the most important labour system employed was arrendamiento (quit-rent tenancy), with two categories of arrendadores residing on the property. First, a total of 72 arrendadores cabezonarios ('principle tenants'), enjoyed access to land on payment of cash rents in accordance with the area they ploughed and the number of livestock they pastured on the hacienda. These cabezonarios comprised a group of relatively prosperous smallholders within Combayo's social structure, for below them a group of sub-tenants called arrendadores agregados, was to be found. Typically they were poorer relations or dependents of the cabezonarios, who acted as their representatives before the estate's administration. In the agricultural year 1917-18, some 133 agregados were settled on the estate.
With regard to the rents levied, both categories of quit-rent tenants had to pay S/.2.50 (two soles fifty centavos) per annum for each hectare of land they cultivated, S/.1.00 per annum for grazing rights on every head of cattle or equines (ganado mayor), S/.0.25 per head of sheep and goats (ganado menor) and S/.0.80 for each pig. In the same agricultural year, the two categories of tenants occupied 622 hectares of cultivated land, 420 of which were under the plough. The remainder lay fallow. Cabezonario households worked an average of 6.75 hectares, the agregados an average of only 1.02 hectares, with barley, wheat and potatoes comprising the main crops -only 10 hectares of maize being sown. 13 Significant differences also existed in terms of livestock ownership. Combayo's tenants possessed 1850 head of cattle, 700 equines, 4,000 sheep and 305 swine, but on average each cabezonario owned 28 cattle and pack animals, as well as 46 head of ganado menor. Obviously this strata of Combayo's peasantry operated sustainable household enterprises. On the other hand, the agregados found themselves in a less favourable situation: on average these tenants possessed four head of ganado mayor and 7.5 head of ganado menor, 14 On top of cash payments for cultivated land and livestock, both categories of tenants had to give fifteen day's labour per year on the estate's demesne, providing their oxen gratis for ploughing and sowing, as well as horses and mules to be utilised at harvest-time for threshing and transporting crops both inside and outside the estate. Each cabezonario had the right to substitute himself with one of "his" agregados when fulfilling this particular obligation.
Apart from the cabezonarios and agregados, a third group of direct producers comprised labour-service tenants, called colonos or "peones de hacienda". In the agricultural year 1917-18 this sector of the estate's workforce amounted to 30 men, who had to labour on the demesne for a minimum of twenty days per month in exchange for a daily cash wage, a place to live on the property and a small plot to cultivate. This category of worker paid no rent for access to estate resources (land for planting, grazing, water and firewood). 15 Finally, on occasions the estate administration celebrated sharecropping contracts with those peones de hacienda or arrendadores agregados who wished to increase their supply of foodstuffs for household consumption. It was customary for the sharecropper to receive land, seed and oxen for ploughing, in return for handing over half of the crop to the landowner. When it was necessary to undertake urgent tasks, such as at harvest time, households engaged in collective labour Çminga ). For Santolalla, these "rural festivals" were indicative of the "sense of solidarity and mutual protection" that existed among the estate's peasantry, because through 13 Nicolás Santolalla Bernal, Monografía de la hacienda San Felipe de Combayo, unpublished thesis (Lima: Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina, July 1918), pp. 22-24.
14 Ibidem. 15 Ibidem. According to Santolalla, the peones de hacienda "hardly work their land owing to a lack of resources", i.e. they were very much proletarianised. Ibidem, p. 31. this mechanism those households who lacked adequate labour resources or key items in the production process (especially oxen) could attain them by "inviting their neighbours and taking on responsibility for providing good food, alcohol and arranging for music to be played during work. When this occurs, no wages are paid". 16 As mentioned, upon securing ownership of Combayo the Santolalla brothers wanted to raise its productivity. One straightforward and inexpensive mechanism to achieve this goal was to attract additional peasant households onto the latifundio, which would increment the amount of labour-time available to the owners and allow them to expand the cultivated area. Nevertheless, this policy proved problematic owing to fierce competition in the local labour market: neighbouring estates also required additional hands, labour contractors in the employ of coastal sugar plantations were active in the locality, as were recruiters for highland mining camps and even the booming Amazon rubber trade. To complicate matters, the peasantry in the zone were not tied to one plot of land and one patrón -labour mobility was high and the rural population was well aware of the various employment alternatives available to them, along with the different wage rates on offer.
Indeed, as a result of bitter personal experience, Eloy and Francisco Santolalla understood fully the difficulties they faced in attracting labour onto Combayo. When they took over the administration of the property and began to impose "order", several tenants (encouraged by their brother-in-law Carlos Montoya Bernal who opposed the transfer in ownership), resisted the new work practices being introduced and left the estate to offer their services to the neighbouring haciendas of Pallán and Llaucán. 17 Faced with this delicate situation, in November 1892 Santolalla wrote to the Prefect of Cajamarca informing him that Montoya Bernal "has incited all the labourers ("peonada") to request a drawing up of accounts prior to their immediate abandonment of Combayo. This mischief has sown complete disorder and produced anarchy among the workforce", a strategy employed by his rival "because he realised that it would cause me heavy losses, not only in my farming activities, but also to my livestock interests, which would be at the mercy of rustlers and other delinquents owing to a lack of stockmen and shepherds". 18 Faced with this prospect, Santolalla argued that "I do not, and could not, refuse to settle their accounts and pay the small amount of wages that I may owe these labourers, but at present it is not possible to do so until the year ends on 31 December" (i.e. the following month), a delaying tactic employed in order to give him time to hire new personnel. 19 As a result of this dispute, Combayo's owners quickly came to appreciate the limits to their power -they realised that if additional labour was to be attracted onto the estate it was necessary to grant concessions to both existing or potential tenants and labourers. For this reason, the administration did not collect the levels of rent that were stipulated in the hacienda's regulations, a policy that was explained by Nicolás Santolalla in the following terms:
"As special concessions are made with the objective of obtaining additional labourers to attend to the different jobs on the estate, the peones de hacienda pay nothing for the plots they occupy and most tenants only pay S/.0.40 per head of ganado mayor and S/.0.10 for ganado menor." 20 It was also noted that: "Many owners of livestock are dissatisfied because the lands they occupy are exhausted, or because of the restrictions and impositions placed upon them by neighbouring communities or landowners. It is therefore possible to attract them to other places if they are given the right incentives." 21 This policy had been implemented successfully by the administration of Combayo, given that "in less than five years the number of arrendadores has risen from 48 to 72". 22 However, the downside of having to charge lower rents was that the amount collected had fallen from a potential S/.5,323 if the official rates had been levied, to between S/.2,500 and S/.3,000 per year. The annual loss to the estate through not charging the peones de hacienda for grazing rights totalled S/.956.60. An additional charge was incurred in order to recruit labourers to work in the hacienda foundry -some 40 people -who on top of their cash wage received a smallholding and free pasture for their animals, necessary incentives if the required number were to be attracted and retained in this occupation.
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According to Santolalla, as it was "difficult to recruit labour for estates in the sierra", cash wages had to be paid to Combayo's workforce. 24 Consequently, in the agricultural year 1917-18, when members of arrendador households were employed on the demesne, a monetary payment of S/.0.30 per day was made; in addition they were provided with a midday meal at a cost of S/.0.10, making an overall charge to the hacienda of S/.0.40 per day per worker. For their part, the peones de hacienda earned a wage of S/.0.20 per day, received a meal worth S/.0.10 and gained concessions on land and livestock rents calculated at S/.0.13 per day, to produce a daily real cost to the landowner of S/.0.43 per labourer. Female members of these households (on average 25 women per day), took turns to work for the estate in tasks such as milking, butter-and cheese-making, milling flour, harvesting maize, as well as domestic jobs in the casa hacienda. When performing these activities, they received a low cash remuneration (S/.0.05 per day) plus rations. Women belonging to arrendador households did not work directly for the landowner and (in the opinion of Santolalla), would not do so "even if they were offered favourable terms".
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The estate also employed children of between seven and fourteen years of age on less heavy chores (helping with threshing, tending livestock and domestic service), for which they gained a daily cash wage of between S/.0.15 and S/.0.25 (according to the particular job), in addition to a meal at midday. When employees engaged in work outside of Combayo (usually transporting commodities to market), they 25 Ibidem, p. 27. This resistance was partly explained by the fact that many tenants operated relatively prosperous household economies that demanded a significant labour input, labour that gave a better return than the extremely low jornal women received when working for the hacienda. In addition, women working outside the home were thought to be more vulnerable to sexual abuse. earned a jornal of S/.0.40 and S/.0.50, depending on the distance they had to travel.
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These payments were for an eight-hour day, although during the harvest or when other tasks needed to be completed hastily, this could be extended to ten hours. Muleteers transporting hacienda produce usually put in a twelve hour shift. Women worked between six and eight hours per day. The piecework system ("a tarea" or "destajo") already utilised on coastal sugar and rice estates by the late 1910s, was not employed on Combayo: while the daily duties that needed to be undertaken were known to the workforce, even if a task had not been completed by the end of a shift, the full jornal was paid -a concession to the more variable climatic conditions prevailing in the sierra. Nevertheless, where a particular agricultural activity could be calculated with a degree of accuracy, the estate administration did try to impose precise work quotas on direct producers, e.g. each labourer had to shear a minimum of 25 sheep per day to earn his jornal·, women were required to peel four arrobas (100 pounds) of potatoes when preparing chuño, process six arrobas of toasted barley, or clean three arrobas of wheat prior to milling.
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With regard to the livestock side of the estate's operation, on Combayo stockmen who tended herds of up to 200 head of cattle gained a monthly wage of between S/.4.00 and S/.6.00; their boy assistants being paid S/.3.00. Shepherds charged with overseeing flocks to a maximum of 1,000 head, earned S/.4.50 per month; girls responsible for up to 250 sheep received S/.3.00 a month. The real cost to the estate, however, was greater given that these employees paid no rent for the plots they cultivated or for their animals. Day-to-day supervisory tasks fell to foremen (mayorales), who gained a monthly cash remuneration along with other privileges (free accommodation, cultivated land and pasture rights). "Comisarios" (chargehands), whose responsibility it was to inform the labourers what tasks they had to undertake, where they needed to present themselves for work and what animals or implements they should take to the fields with them, formed the lowest rung on Combayo's administrative structure. Like the foremen, they enjoyed concessions on rent payments, generous access to the estate's resources, as well as "the honorary title". The individuals occupying these positions were selected from the ranks of the arrendadores cabezonarios and gained a monthly wage of between S/.9.00 and S/. 12.00, depending on their degree of responsibility.
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From the preceding account, it can be appreciated that the social structure of the hacienda Combayo was quite complex. A clearly defined hierarchy existed, but had a much more intricate pattern than a simple division between "landlord" and "peasant". In the first place, the administrative structure incorporated members of the tenantry, while among direct producers important differences in status, levels of prosperity and remuneration were to be found. As the landlord wanted the arrendadores to work on the demesne, they earned higher wages than the colonos. These divisions within Combayo's workforce help explain why an anti-landlord collective mobilisation failed to materialise during the early decades of the twentieth century. The owners enjoyed ample opportunity to operate a policy of "divide and rule". However, the existence of different labour systems, such as quitrent and labour-service tenancy, was not primarily due to questions of social control. Economic calculation heavily influenced landlord decision-making in this regard. While the hiring of colonos was necessary to undertake the day-to-day running of the hacienda, this labour system was not by itself sufficient to fulfil all aspects of its farming activity. As the agricultural system remained in the pretractorised era, food production relied almost completely on animal traction (oxen). Furthermore, the estate needed to commercialise its foodstuffs and minerals, operations requiring a considerable number of pack animals to be housed on the estate. One constant problem for the landowner, however, was that the colonos often failed to tend hacienda livestock with the necessary degree of diligence, for labour expended on these tasks brought them no obvious economic benefit. To complicate matters from the landlord's perspective, direct producers resisted outright proletarianisation and prioritised work on their own plots. 30 Also, it was difficult (and expensive) to maintain an adequate level of supervision on an enterprise that extended over 43,000 hectares, a situation that provided opportunity for "labourer resistance" via the lifting of livestock. For various reasons, therefore, it was necessary to operate another labour system that ensured that work and pack animals were well looked after. This requirement was attained through quit-rent tenancy, which had the added benefit for the landowner in that the arrendadores shouldered the expense of keeping their animals throughout the year at little cost to the estate. For this reason the arrendadores not only had the obligation to work for wages for a minimum of fifteen days per year during the planting season and at harvest time, they also had to provide their work and pack animals free of charge.
Other aspects of the social situation found on Combayo are worthy of mention. Santolalla observed that in the minifundio zones that surrounded the estate, many peasants could not meet subsistence requirements from on-farm production and were consequently forced to migrate in search of waged labour on the coast. 31 This indicates that the arrendadores cabezonarios settled on Combayo not only benefited from greater autonomy from landlord control and operated more prosperous household economies than the arrendadores agregados and colonos, they also enjoyed a better standard of living than a large swathe of "free" peasant smallholders housed in neighbouring villages -in contrast to the stereotypical image that portrays hacienda dwellers as the most exploited and downtrodden sector of the rural population. This was partly explained by the fact that Combayo's tenants did not suffer from rack-renting, as the owner was keen to attract additional people onto the estate. For the same reason an oppressive system of debt bondage did not operate and while profit was exacted from 30 Santolalla alluded to this pattern of behaviour when he noted that "the colonos prefer to labour independently and, except on rare occasions, are reluctant to work for wages [...] This is understandable, because when they dedicate more time to cultivating their plots, the value of the output they receive is greater than the highest wages that can be paid under current economic conditions". Ibidem, p. 23. 31 According to Santolalla: "There is a constant large-scale flow of workers to haciendas on the coast from the neighbouring villages of Sorochuco, La Encañada, La Asunción, etc., who go in search of a livelihood that their homeland cannot provide. This causes the ruin of many of them, because of the illnesses they catch. They also have to leave their families in the most pitiful conditions". Ibidem, p. 98. direct producers, estate administrators placed no obstacle in the way of households attaining three of their principle preoccupationsautonomy, security and mobility: (i) tenants had ample autonomy in the operation of their own farming activities, insofar as the landowners did not interfere in their affairs so long as they kept up their rent payments; (ii) the hacienda represented security in the sense that it offered access to land, reasonable and negotiable levels of rent and the possibility to obtain waged employment when cash needs arose; and (iii) direct producers did not encounter restrictions on their freedom of movement either inside or outside the estate, in that they regularly travelled to La Encañada or Caj amarca to buy and sell commodities (indeed, they had to do so in order to get cash to pay their rents).
Landlord-peasant social and economic relations, therefore, where much more complex than the image of straightforward domination given in the standard literature on the Andean hacienda. Although one social agent was clearly in a more powerful position, both sides had to make concessions and negotiate. Neither attained all that they desired. While it would be too much to expect that both parties were happy with their situation, this need to accommodate introduced a certain elasticity into landlord-peasant relations, a factor that helps explain why no anti-landlord social movement arose on the estate.
AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES
Although important changes were already in evidence, like other haciendas in the department of Cajamarca in the 1910s, the farming methods utilised on Combayo remained primitive. Ploughing was undertaken by oxen, little mechanisation had taken place, traditional varieties of seed derived from the previous year's harvest were sown despite being vulnerable to disease, fertiliser use was inadequate and it was customary to plant the same crop in the same field for several consecutive years. Low yields resulted: during the agricultural years from 1913 through to 1917, on land cultivated directly by the hacienda an average of 115 kilos of wheat were sown per hectare, which produced a harvest of 800 kilos, a seed harvest ratio of around 1:7. On plots worked by the tenants, a lower return of between 600-800 kilos had been registered. Barley gave a slightly higher yield in that an average of 138 kilos of seed sown per hectare resulted in harvests of 1,380 kilos, while on land planted by the estate's tenants output reached between 1,380 and 2,000 kilos per hectare.
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In order to enhance this performance, the estate had embarked upon certain improvements. Experiments with a new variety of wheat ("Mocho") were undertaken successfully on lands tilled by the hacendado, which had a better germination rate, was more hardy and resistant to wheat rust ('Ία roya"). With adequate care in soil preparation and weeding, yields "have risen by 50 per cent, producing a good quality grain": an average of 103.5 kilos of seed resulted in an average harvest of 1,242 kilos, but when this new strain of wheat was sown after potatoes, a return of 2,587 kilos occurred. 33 Keen to attain similar advances with regard to the second most important cereal produced on the estate -barley -successful trials with malt barley had been conducted. These improvements produced higher profits. After deducting the cost incurred for labour, inputs and transport, the new strain of wheat allowed a gain of S/.22.70 per hectare, compared to S/.3.00 from plantings of traditional varieties. Improved varieties of barley also brought a positive return, but maize and broad bean production resulted in losses (maize) or a minimal profit (broad beans). With respect to potato cultivation, despite high labour and other production costs (to grow one hectare of potatoes, between 1913 and 1917 the estate invested in an average of 144 day's wages for work undertaken by men, 35 by women and 20 by children), even assuming a moderate harvest of 5,600 kilos per hectare, a profit of 45 per cent on expenditure was calculated. Consequently, Santolalla felt that "it is worthwhile to extend the area planted with this crop", especially as strong demand for potatoes existed in highland and coastal markets. 34 This policy was also recommended on other grounds. As the cost of purchasing fertiliser and transporting it to the estate was prohibitively expensive, it became more cost effective to maintain soil fertility and yields by extending the system of crop rotation that had recently been introduced in the production process, a rotation in which potato cultivation played a central role. By following a planting cycle of wheat-potatoes-barley-clover, the traditional practice of leaving land fallow for a number of years could be abandoned. This not only increased overall output and profits, crop rotation led to improved disease control and enabled soil fertility to be preserved at a reduced cost. With an eye to increasing production levels and labour productivity, it was also recommended that metal ploughs, harrows and rollers be introduced to improve soil preparation, as well as scythes and threshers to speed harvest operations.
Owing to the political turmoil of the 1880s, livestock levels on Combayo had plummeted, followed by a slow process of recuperation once the Santolalla brothers acquired the property. By the 1910s cattle rearing comprised the enterprise's most important activity: in the agricultural year 1917-18 the landowners possessed 595 head of cattle and 76 oxen, a figure well below the 1,850 cattle tenants pastured on the hacienda. Agricultural practices vis-à-vis this branch of the estate's operations remained backward. Cattle were kept in open fields and grazed on unimproved pastures, animal selection was rarely undertaken, the stocking density per hectare remained low and growth rates extremely slow. Cows only produced between 0.75 and 2.50 litres of milk per day, while a revision of hacienda account books revealed that between 1900 and 1912 birth rates as a percentage of the stock of cows possessed by the owners barely reached 35 per cent. At the same time, the mortality rate among calves was unacceptably high (9 per cent). On the other hand, cattle belonging to Combayo's tenants received more careful treatment. Being better fed they registered quicker rates of growth, weighed more and produced higher milk yields; mortality rates among the tenant's cattle were "well below" those belonging to the hacienda, while birth rates "currently stood at between 60 and 80 per cent", a figure far in excess of that traditionally obtained by the landlord enterprise. 35 The problems confronting the owners with respect to this branch of the estate's activities were compounded by acts of "everyday resistance" perpetrated by the stockmen: Santolalla lamented "the lack of control that allowed the pastores to cheat", either by stealing hacienda cattle or "swopping poorer quality animals" for better specimens belonging to the estate. 36 To compound matters, Combayo's administrators experienced difficulties in disciplining the work-force. Because it was hard to contract new stockmen or shepherds, they could not be fired summarily and expelled from the estate, even when it was known that they had stolen hacienda property or failed to undertake their tasks with the desired degree of diligence.
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Faced with this unsatisfactory situation, beginning in 1912 the landowners had embarked upon a policy of rationalising cattle-rearing operations on Combayo with the objective of increasing total output, productivity and profitability. To this end a range of modern herd management practices were introduced -a more rigorous selection of breeding stock, a separation of the cattle into smaller herds, closer day-to-day supervision and attention to ensure that cows were put to the bull shortly after giving birth, etc. -so that between 1914 and 1917 annual birth rates had risen to 60 per cent. Fields had been sub-divided and sown with alfalfa, rye grass and clover in order to improve carrying capacity, animal growth and the general physical condition of the livestock. Food supplements (salt, barley, alfalfa) started to be fed to the cattle, innovations that produced a substantial increase in milk production and reduced significantly the age at which animals became ready for market or could begin breeding. 38 With a view to reducing rustling and enable estate administrators to keep a closer check on the development of the various herds and individual animals, a system of numbering and ear-marking had been introduced. According to Santolalla, the next step in the modernisation of Comabyo's livestock operations was to be the purchase and acclimatisation of improved breeds, such as Brown Swiss, which would enable the hacienda to expand its output of cheese and butter. Given that the sale of these commodities yielded the highest profit, investment and administrative effort was being concentrated on developing these activities. On the other hand, sheep-rearing (which brought low returns) was being phased out, along with another line of production with a long tradition on the estate -the breeding of pack animals for sale to muleteers. From the preceding account, it is clear that the hacienda operated a modern accounting system that enabled Combayo's owners to make detailed calculations with regard to operating costs, prices and levels of profitability. By the late 1910s these considerations were of central concern to the estate administrators as they embarked upon the process of capitalising the property and modernising its farming methods. Rational decision-making aimed at maximising profitability, rather than concerns over tradition, status or seigneurial prestige guided landlord behaviour.
MARKET AND BUSINESS STRATEGY
The hacienda Combayo confronted certain problems when it came to commercialising agricultural commodities. Demand in local highland markets remained limited across a whole range of products. The largest markets existed in Lima, as well as towns and plantations located on the northern coast. Transport costs to the littoral, however, were high because the railway line from the port of Pacasmayo ended at Chilete, approximately 92 kilometres from the estate. Although the government had begun to construct a road to link Cajamarca with Pacasmayo, commodities still needed to be transported to the railhead by muleteers, a slow and costly method that frequently became dangerous due to the activities of brigands. Given these circumstances, after making a detailed calculation of comparative production costs, transport charges and prices, Combayo's administration pursued a strategy of targeting coastal markets where demand was buoyant and prices more favourable, especially in relation to transport costs. Consequently, wheat flour was delivered to commercial houses located in Lima and Trujillo, while potatoes were sold in Pacasmayo, Chepen and other settlements within the vicinity of the rail terminal. Supplying beef cattle to coastal markets comprised another lucrative activity, as did the sale of butter and cheese in Lima, Trujillo and to coastal sugar plantations.
Market considerations exercised an important influence on the business strategy that was devised for the hacienda. After noting that yearly profits averaged S/.7,800 (S/.3,000 resulting from operations undertaken on the demesne, plus S/.4,800 deriving from the collection of rents and other sources), a figure which Santolalla considered to be "very low" 40 in relation to the estate's potential, it was calculated that returns could be augmented significantly by intensifying production and output per hectare. To obtain this goal, a three-pronged strategy was proposed. First, substantial areas of moorland (jalea) and less fertile hillside land should be transferred to the arrendadores cabezonarios, whose number needed to be gradually increased from 72 to 250 families via a colonisation policy, with the estate providing support to enable these households to mount relatively prosperous smallholdings. Second, on 600 hectares of better quality valley land (of which 400 hectares were irrigable), the estate needed to concentrate investment and continue its policy of modernisation and intensification by building up an efficient dairy enterprise (including the purchase of pedigree bulls), with a view to incrementing the production of cheese and butter. Parallel with this initiative, it would be advantageous for the estate to expand its stock of beef cattle up to 1,200 head, with the principal market being the coast. Third, the estate should become involved in purchasing and marketing produce from its tenants, concentrating on those commodities that commanded the highest profits. 
CONCLUSION
These proposals for developing the hacienda provide an interesting insight into the mentality of Combayo's owners. The policy of expanding the number of tenants settled on the property was not being pursued in order to enhance the political power of the Santolalla family by increasing the number of their direct dependents and so their coterie of pistoleros (the traditional interpretation of landlord behaviour in this part of the Andes). Instead it was driven by a desire to raise output and income derived from rents. Furthermore, extra arrendadores were not being attracted onto the estate with a view to grinding them down via an oppressive rack-renting regime. Rather, the estate aimed to allow tenants to cultivate larger plots and breed more animals. Additional landlord income was to be gained as a result of higher tenant living standards, not through a policy of naked exploitation and impoverishment.
40 Ibidem, pp. 96-97. 41 Ibidem, pp. 98, 105. The intention was to establish a dairy, purchase milk from the tenants and market cheese and butter. Ibidem, p. 103.
Hand in hand with a controlled process of "internal encroachment" brought about by an expansion in the tenant economy on Combayo, hacendado earnings were also to be augmented through a "neo-Junker" modernisation strategy. This entailed concentrating investment on the more fertile core of the hacienda, where an intensive cattle-rearing enterprise would be integrated with profitable crop production via a planned rotation system. Interestingly, this mirrored a pattern of agricultural change occurring in north-west Europe and parts of the USA during the late-nineteenth century (as identified by Karl Kautsky in "The Agrarian Question", among others). Whereas the stereotyped view of the Andean hacienda claimed that hacendados operated their properties with the goal of maximising self-sufficiency and engaged in minimal market contact, for the owners of Combayo the sale of commodities was of prime concern. They were extremely market conscious: production of items that yielded no or scant returns needed to be curtailed and emphasis given to products that provided the highest profits. In contrast to the common portrait of the non-entrepreneurial hacendado who operated a barely monetised, haphazardly administered property, decision-making on these issues was undertaken via a process of rational commercial calculation.
In other important respects the situation found on the hacienda Combayo departed from the traditional view of the Andean latifundium. Cash payments (through wages or rents) were a standard feature of landlord-direct producer relations, while no harsh system of debt bondage tied campesinos to the estate against their will. Disgruntled tenants and labourers could threaten to leave the hacienda -and did so when they considered such a move to be in their interest -without the landlord having much ability to stop them due to a weak state and a fragmented local power structure. To maintain the existing workforce on Combayo, keep pilfering at a tolerable level and attract additional hands, the owners found themselves compelled to offer concessions on matters of rents, access to estate resources and work quotas.
Given the degree of competition in the regional labour market and the difficulty Combayo (and other highland estates) experienced in recruiting and retaining direct producers (especially shepherds), the hacendado had to allow a degree of "internal encroachment" with regard to pastures, crop land and other assets -to the extent that it was even necessary to turn a blind eye to the lifting of hacienda property. The warp and woof of landlord-peasant power relations on the hacienda Combayo, therefore, departed significantly from the onedimensional image proffered by the mainstream literate of omnipotence, domination and subordination: estate tenants and labourers were not powerless and contested landlord efforts to extract labour, cash or agricultural commodities through pursuing a variety of measures aimed to "work the system to their minimal disadvantage". 42 Nor was the social structure found on the hacienda Combayo an uncomplicated affair, whereby a landowner stood in opposition to a homogeneous mass of poverty-stricken servile tenants. Important differences in living standards, status and obligation existed among the work-force, some of whom acted as mediators between patron and peasant. These intermediaries could command favours from the hacendado, but also had on occasions to intercede effectively on behalf of their fellow tenants if their "buffer" position was to be preserved. Hierarchical reciprocity and mutual accommodation knitted together Combayo's farming community. Finally, although it has been stated correctly that haciendas in Latin America "have always been noted for their diversity", the situation found on Combayo during the early decades of the twentieth century was by no means unique to that particular estate. 43 Indeed, most haciendas in the northern highlands exhibited similar characteristics.
